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Abstract
Explaining sophisticated machine-learning based
systems is an important issue at the foundations
of AI. Recent efforts [Ribeiro et al., 2016;
Ribeiro et al., 2018; Wachter et al., 2017;
Ignatiev et al., 2019; Bachoc et al., 2018] have
shown various methods for providing explanations.
These approaches can be broadly divided into
two schools: those that provide a local and human
interpreatable approximation of a machine learning
algorithm, and logical approaches that exactly
characterise one aspect of the decision. In this
paper we focus upon the second school of exact
explanations with a rigorous logical foundation.
There is an epistemological problem with these
exact methods. While they can furnish complete
explanations, such explanations may be too com-
plex for humans to understand or even to write
down in human readable form. Interpretability re-
quires epistemically accessible explanations, expla-
nations humans can grasp. Yet what is a sufficiently
complete epistemically accessible explanation still
needs clarification. We do this here in terms of
counterfactuals, following [Wachter et al., 2017].
With counterfactual explanations, many of the as-
sumptions needed to provide a complete explana-
tion are left implicit. To do so, counterfactual ex-
planations exploit the properties of a particular data
point or sample, and as such are also local as well
as partial explanations. We explore how to move
from local partial explanations to what we call com-
plete local explanations and then to global ones.
But to preserve accessibility we argue for the need
for partiality. This partiality makes it possible to
hide explicit biases present in the algorithm that
may be injurious or unfair. We investigate how easy
it is to uncover these biases in providing complete
and fair explanations by exploiting the structure of
the set of counterfactuals providing a complete lo-
cal explanation.
1 Introduction
Explaining the predictions of sophisticated machine-learning
algorithms is an important issue for the foundations of AI.
Recent efforts [Ribeiro et al., 2016; Ribeiro et al., 2018;
Wachter et al., 2017; Ignatiev et al., 2019;
Bachoc et al., 2018] have shown various methods for
providing explanations. These approaches can be broadly
divided into two schools: those that provide a local and
human interpretable approximation of a machine learning
algorithm, and logical approaches that completely charac-
terise one aspect of the decision. In this paper we investigate
a comparison between complete explanations and partial,
epistemically accessible ones.
There is an epistemological problem with these complete
methods. While they can furnish complete explanations, such
explanations may be too complex for humans to understand
or even to write down in human readable form. Interpretabil-
ity requires epistemically accessible explanations, explana-
tions humans can grasp. Yet what is a sufficiently complete
or adequate epistemically accessible explanation still needs
analysis. We provide such an analysis in terms of counterfac-
tuals, following [Wachter et al., 2017].
With counterfactual explanations, many of the assumptions
needed to provide a complete explanation are left implicit. To
do so, counterfactual explanations exploit the properties of a
particular data point or sample, and as such are also local as
well as partial explanations. We explore how to move from
local partial explanations to what we call complete local ex-
planations and then to global ones. But to preserve accessibil-
ity we argue for the need for partiality. This partiality makes
it possible to hide explicit biases present in the algorithm that
may be injurious or unfair. We investigate how easy it is to
uncover these biases in providing complete and fair explana-
tions by exploiting the structure of the set of counterfactuals
providing a complete local explanation.
To make the point about biases in counterfactual explana-
tions concrete, consider the following scenario. An ML pro-
gram judges A’s application for a loan. A is turned down.
When A asks the bank for an explanation of the decision, the
bank returns with the following.
(1) Your income is 50K euro per year.
(2) If your income had been 100K euro per year, you
would have gotten the loan.
The counterfactual in (2) might be true but it also might be
misleading, hiding a bias that one might find unfair. Suppose
that (1)-(2) is the explanation the bank gives A. But suppose
also that there is another more morally repugnant explana-
tion: A black. If A had been white he would have gotten the
loan with your current income of 50K per year. There’s also
a question of features that indirectly code bias. For example,
tying the loan availability to the postal code of A’s residence
could be a way of encoding racial bias.
The problem of dissimulating a bias when giving an expla-
nation is a direct outcome of the partiality of epistemically
accessible explanations.
2 Background on explanations
Suppose that f : Xn → Y is the “ideal” function taking data
encoded in an n-dimensional space of features Xn into the
representations in Y and that fˆ : Xn → Y is the function that
the algorithm has encoded. For this paper, we’ll assume that fˆ
is some sort of classifier and thus we can assume Y to be a set
of classes. We want to have an explanation of why fˆ outputs
the predictions it does. We might want to know its behavior
over the total space Xn; this would be a complete explanation.
But for many purposes, we might only need to know how fˆ
behaves on a data point of interest or focal point, like A’s pro-
file that was submitted to the loan program. Note that, we are
implicitly assuming that fˆ is too complex or opaque for its be-
haviour to be analyzed statically. For instance, fˆ might be a
neural network with multiple layers/parameters/variables etc.
Or, it might be be case that we have access only to the bina-
ries of fˆ , from which the actual algorithm cannot be reverse-
engineered.
There are two sorts of explanations of program behav-
ior. Internal explanations involve the internal states of the
program—if these are linked by logic then we can have a de-
ductive explanation for a particular response inY to input data
from Xn. However, there are also external explanations that
involve linking features of X with output Y (we can also have
a deductive link or something else). These are initially attrac-
tive because they do not involve unpacking the algorithms’
internal states and assigning them a meaning, which in the
case of deep learning networks with multiple hidden layers
can be a very complicated affair. Even partial explanations
that exploit internal states of a complex neural architecture
may be epistemically inaccessible.
[Ignatiev et al., 2019] provide a definition of complete ex-
planations. They assume a classifier fˆ can be represented as a
set of logic formulas, which we assume here too. In addition,
we will assume that fˆ has a constant set of features with
binary values making the encoding into logic transparent.1
For [Ignatiev et al., 2019], an explanation, or what we call
andMS explanation, of a prediction pi of a classifier fˆ given a
feature space X is a subset minimal set of literals E (each one
describing a value of a feature in the problem space) such that
1By increasing the number of literals we can simulate nonbinary
values, so this is not really a limitation as long as the features are
finite.
E |=
∧
fˆ → pi
where
∧
ranges over the set of formulas encoding fˆ . E |=
fˆ → pimeans that we can prove in the logic representation that
fˆ predicts pi given any instance with features as described in
E . A complete explanation of the behavior of fˆ in our sense
would be the set of all possible MS explanations.
An instance in such a set up is a set of literals
that assigns values to every feature in the feature space.
The underlying logical form of explanations discussed in
[Ignatiev et al., 2019] thus exploit universal generalizations
and a deductive consequence relation. The explanations in
[Ignatiev et al., 2019] thus explain in principle sets of in-
stances, and they are known as global explanations and are
a version of a deductive nomological explanation, where a
relation of entailment holds between the explanans and the
explanandum.2
Counterfactuals offer a natural way to provide epistemi-
cally accessible, partial explanations geared toward properties
of individuals or focal points. Such explanations directed to a
particular case are often called local explanations in contrast
to global ones [Ribeiro et al., 2016; Ribeiro et al., 2018].
One reason for using counterfactuals in explanations is that
counterfactuals lend themselves to an attractive analysis of
causation, as [Lewis, 1973] proposed.
The reason why counterfactual explanations furnish natural
candidates for partial epistemically accessible explanations is
that they single out properties or features that would make a
difference to a decision about an individual as in (2), other
things being as equal as they can be given that the indi-
vidual has the property described by the counterfactual’s
antecedent. This ceteris paribus property of counterfactuals
means that many factors that would be mentioned in a com-
plete explanation can remain implicit. They are thus more
partial than MS explanations.
The canonical semantics for counterfactuals symbolised
via → as outlined in [Lewis, 1973] exploits a possible
worlds model for propositional logic and crucially a similar-
ity relation: A → B is true at world w just in case for all
worlds w′ in which A is true and that are the closest worlds to
w in which A is true, B is true.
The similarity relation in Lewis’s semantics is used to
model the complicated nature of causal laws, which are them-
selves often formulated with ceteris paribus assumptions. In
particular, allows us to have consistent laws with conflicting
consequents and antecedents ordered by entailment as in the
following set of cascading counterfactuals:
(3) a. If I were making 100K euro or more, I would
have gotten the loan.
b. If I were making 100K euro or more but were
convicted of a serious financial fraud, I would not
2Note however, such global generalizations may not offer a
mathematical function or rule based reconstruction of fˆ ’s behav-
ior. Thus, global explanations may be extensional as in the case
[Ignatiev et al., 2019] or intensional in the form of a rule reconstruc-
tion of fˆ .
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get the loan.
c. If If I were making 100K euro or more and were
convicted of a serious financial fraud but then the
conviction was overturned and I was awarded a
medal, I would get the loan.
In a cascading set of counterfactuals we can count how many
times the value of the consequent changes as we move from
one antecedent to a logically more specific one (e.g., does the
prediction flip from A to A∧C or from A∧C to A∧C∧D).
We will call the number of flips the degree of the cascad-
ing set. The counterfactual semantics with weak centering3
permits the counterfactuals in (3) to be satisfiable at a world
without forcing the antecedents of (3)b or (3)c to be inconsis-
tent. The reason for this is that strengthening of the antecedent
fails for counterfactuals; the closest worlds in which I make
100k euro do not include a world w in which I make 100k
euro but am also convicted of fraud. Counterfactuals share
this property with other conditionals that have been used
as the basis for nonmonotonic reasoning [Ginsberg, 1986;
Pearl, 1990]. However, if the actual world turns out to be like
w, then by weak centering (3)a turns out to be false, because
the ceteris paribus assumption in (3)a is that the actual world
is one in which I’m not convicted of fraud.
In adapting counterfactuals to provide explanations of a
learning algorithm’s behavior around a focal point, it is nat-
ural to interpret the similarity relation appealed to in the se-
mantics of counterfactuals as a distance function over the fea-
ture space X used to describe data points—in effect identify-
ing the latter as the relevant “ worlds” for the semantics of the
counterfactuals to be defined over. To find the relevant coun-
terfactuals to explain the behavior of fˆ around a focal point
xp ∈ X
n where X has n dimensions, we exploit a linear map
∆i : X
n → Xn where ∆i is defined such that there is a subset
i⊆ {1,2, . . . ,n} such that (i) for any x ∈ X , ∆i(x) differs from
x only concerning values for dimensions in i, (ii) fˆ (xp) = η;
(iii) fˆ (∆i(xp)) = pi, with η,pi two incompatible predictions in
Y and (iv) ∀x∈X such that fˆ (x)= pi and x differs from xp only
on the values of dimensions i, ‖x− xp‖X ≥ ‖∆i(xp)− xp‖X ,
where ‖.‖X is a natural norm on X like the Euclidean norm.
Thus, ∆i represents a minimal change in the features of xp
(values of xp in the dimensions i) needed to shift the pre-
dictions of fˆ to pi from the unwanted prediction fˆ (xp). Ex-
ploiting the translation from feature values to literals, the an-
tecedents of our target counterfactuals will express these fea-
tures a conjunction of literals.
As discussed in [Kusner et al., 2017], these linear maps
can be generated via techniques of adversarial perturbations.4
A typical definition of an adversarial perturbation of an im-
age x, given a classifier, is that it is a smallest change to x such
that the classification changes. Essentially, this is a counter-
factual by a different name. Finding a closest possible world
to x such that the classification changes is, under the right
3Weak centering requires that w≤w w
′ for all w′.
4[Kusner et al., 2017] explore how to uncover these biased ex-
planations and reveal the ones that are damaging. He uses a Pearl
causal system to generate counterfactuals, where the causal variables
are exogenous descriptions of input data for the ML algorithm.
choice of distance function, the same as finding the smallest
change to x to get the classifier to make a different predic-
tion. Adversarial perturbation has been the locus of a lot of
recent research activity and can be computed quite efficiently
[Dube, 2018]. Proofs for minimal perturbations can be found
using optimal transport theory [Bachoc et al., 2018].
The fact that counterfactuals are closely tied to adversarial
examples relative to some focal point invites a comparison
to recent work by [Ignatiev et al., 2019] on explanations
and adversarial examples in a deductive framework. The
discussion in [Ignatiev et al., 2019] of counterexamples and
adversarial examples builds a bridge between deductive
nomological explanations and local counterfactual explana-
tions based on a particular focal point. A counterexample
to a prediction pi is a subset minimal set of literals A such that
A |=
∧
fˆ →
∨
δ6=pi,δ∈Y
δ.
[Ignatiev et al., 2019] show that counterexamples and expla-
nations are incompatible in that every explanation and every
counterexample to a prediction pi contain literals ei and c j
such that ei is inconsistent with c j. An adversarial example
to a predication pi for x is then an instance that has all the
features of a counterexample to pi and otherwise has the fea-
tures of the instance x. An adversarial example for a learning
model fˆ thus is a closest element y in X to a focal point xp,
in which certain features are shifted so that fˆ (y) is a different
prediction from fˆ (x). An adversarial example then can be de-
fined in terms of a linear map ∆i on X , and this map links the
adversarial example with a counterfactual.
Counterexamples can also serve as the basis of explana-
tions of properties of a focal element.
• Why not pi for x?
• x has features of A and A is a counterexample to pi (A |=
fˆ →¬pi).
Note that this deductive explanation is distinct from coun-
terfactual explanations. When a counterfactual is used to give
an explanation, the relationship between the explanans and
the explanandum is not logical consequnce but a more prag-
matic relation based on a Lewisian analysis of causation. The
counterfactual in (2) gives a sufficient reason for A’s getting
the loan, all other factors of my situation being equal or being
as equal as possible given the assumption of a different salary
for me. Deductive explanations specify those ceteris paribus
conditions; this makes them more complex but also invari-
ant with respect to the choice of focal point. Counterfactual
explanations depend on the nature of the focal point.
This (relative) simplicity comes at a cost. Counterfac-
tuals may offer only a partial explanation in some cases
[Wachter et al., 2017]. In fact there are two sorts of partial-
ity in a counterfactual explanation. First a counterfactual ex-
planation doesn’t specify the ceteris paribus conditions and
so doesn’t specify what is necessary for the prediction—call
this partiality. On the other hand counterfactual explanations
are also partial in the sense that they don’t specify all the suf-
ficient conditions for the prediction; they are hence what are
called local explanations. A given counterfactual might give
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only a partial picture of the behavior of the program or agent.
It might not give a complete local explanation of a decision,
as such a decision might be over determined for the given
point at hand. A prediction pi is over determined for a focal
point x0 iff the following set of linear maps contains at least
two elements
{∆i : i⊆ n∧ fˆ (∆i(x0)) = pi∧ fˆ (x0) = η,η 6= pi}
Many real world applications like our bank loan example will
have this feature.
3 From partial to complete explanations
In principle, we can move from a partial picture of the behav-
ior of fˆ to a more complete one. The linear maps ∆i associated
with counterfactuals permit us to plot the local behavior of fˆ
around a focal point xp. If we look at all possible ∆i using all
the possible combinations of dimensions of X , we can plot a
neighborhood around xp, N fˆ ,xp , where for all points z in the
interior N fˆ ,xp , fˆ (z) = fˆ (xp) and for points w on the boundary
of N fˆ ,xp , fˆ (w) 6= fˆ (xp). We call the collection of such linear
maps a complete local explanation of the decision at xp.
N fˆ ,xp captures the fact that there may be several distinct
conditions the lack of which would be causally responsible
for a particular prediction, like my not getting the loan in our
motivating example. Let us call the set of counterfactuals cor-
responding to N fˆ ,xp , S(N fˆ ,xp). S(N fˆ ,xp) may contain many
cascading counterfactuals, and its cascading degree may be
high.
There are some cases in which the geometry of the predic-
tion space allow us to move from complete local to global
explanations of the behavior of fˆ . Suppose fˆ changes val-
ues only once for each feature/dimension di moving out from
a focal point xp.
5 In such a case N fˆ ,xp forms a convex sub-
space of fˆ [X ] and a complete local explanation provides a
full global explanation.
There is an important connection between the cascad-
ing degree of S(N fˆ ,xp) and the geometry of fˆ on the fea-
ture space. If fˆ changes values only once for each fea-
ture/dimension di, S(N fˆ ,xp), has cascading degree 1. In
addition, S(N fˆ ,xp), has cascading degree 1 iff the fea-
ture/dimensions are pairwise independant of each other with
respect to fˆ ’s predictions.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the feature space is Boolean val-
ued. Then S(N fˆ ,xp), has a cascading degree ≤ 2 iff N fˆ ,xp is
convex.
Proof: Note that a cascading set of counterfactuals exhibits
an entailment relation between antecedents. Thus, if φ→
ψ and χ→ ¬ψ are counterfactuals of degrees n and n-1,
φ entails χ. This means that if we have a set S of cascading
counterfactuals of degree 3 or more, we will have antecedents
φ, χ, δ which are conjunctions of feature values, such that if
5By complicating the language of counterfactuals, we can have
probability estimates of literals and so approximate continuous fea-
ture spaces.
φ |= χ |= δ that in the Manhattan space of Boolean features
puts the points in the feature space corresponding to φ, χ, δ
are all on a same line. But if S has degree 3 or greater, this
forcibly means that one of the points will not be in the space
of predictions made fˆ at the other two points. So N fˆ ,xp is non
convex. Conversely, suppose N fˆ ,xp is non convex. Using the
construction of counterfactuals from N fˆ ,xp will immediately
yield a cascading set of degree 3 or higher.
The cascading degree of S(N fˆ ,xp) for nonconvexN fˆ ,xp thus
gives a measure of the degree of non-convexity of N fˆ ,xp , and
a measure of the complexity of an explanation.
Remark 1. : Suppose N fˆ ,xp gives rise to a set of cascading
counterfactuals of degree 2. In this case two complete local
explanations can determine a full global explanation (and de-
termine the behavior of fˆ ).
The problem with complete local explanation is that they
may be still too complex for any human to understand. It is
not unusual for AI applications to encode data via hundreds
even thousands of features. The complete local explanation
would involve too many counterfactuals for humans to grasp.
4 Pragmatic constraints on explanations
Because the set of causal factors can be so complex, it
becomes apparent that explanations must have an impor-
tant pragmatic component. All explanations have an “ex-
plainee” who asks for the explanation, and an explanation
for an explainee must respond to the particular conundrum
that brought the explainee to ask for one [Bromberger, 1962;
Achinstein, 1980].6 For instance, our loan seeker Amay won-
der why the bank refused her a loan when she has what she
thinks is an adequate qualifying income and other qualities.
An appropriate explanation for A would then explain which
of his assumptions was faulty or incomplete, thus solving the
conundrum. In essence, what is going on here is that A has
in mind the “ideal” function f and is confused about why the
value of fˆ on her data xp is not that of f ; i.e. her conundrum
is that f (xp) 6= fˆ (xp). The conundrum can come about for
two reasons: either 0 is simply mistaken about the nature of
fˆ (perhaps she is also mistaken about f or if not, she is mis-
taken about how fˆ differs from f ), or her understanding of f
is incomplete.
For the incompleteness sense, suppose xp is decomposed
into 〈x~d1
,x~d2
〉; for A f only pays attention to the values
of dimensions ~d1 in the sense that for her f (〈x~d1
,x~d2
〉) =
f (〈x~d1
,x′~d2
〉), for any values x′~d2
. An adequate explanationwill
then point out that for some ∆ where ∆(〈x~d1
,x~d2
〉= 〈x~d1
,y~d2
〉,
fˆ (∆(〈x~d1
,y~d2
〉)) = pi while fˆ (xp) = η.
So we have, simplifying, conundra resulting from incom-
pleteness and conundra resulting from mistaken information.
We then stipulate:
CI Suppose we have a conundrum based on incomplete-
ness. An adequate explanation for explainee A who re-
6A more contemporary view aligned with this is [Miller, 2019].
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quests an explanation why fˆ (xp) = η must resolve A’s
conundrum arising from attending only to some dimen-
sions ~d1 of xp = 〈x~d1
,x~d2
〉. More precisely, the explana-
tion must provide a ∆ such that ∆(〈x~d1
,x~d2
〉) = 〈x~d1
,y~d2
〉
and fˆ (∆(xp)) = fˆ (〈x~d1
,y~d2
〉) = pi while fˆ (xp) = η.
CM Suppose A’s conundrum is based on error. An adequate
explanation for explainee A who requests an explana-
tion why fˆ (xp) = η must resolve A’s conundrum by
providing the values for the dimensions ~d2 of xp on
which A is mistaken. More precisely, supposing a de-
composition of xp = 〈x~d1
,x~d2
〉, the explanationmust pro-
vide a ∆ such that ∆(〈x~d1
,x~d2
〉) = 〈y~d1
,x~d2
〉 such that
fˆ (〈y~d1
,x~d2
〉) = fˆ (∆(xp)) = pi while fˆ (xp) = η.
5 The fairness / bias problem
Partial explanations seem good epistemologically, but they
can also be dangerous. We remarked that several counterfac-
tuals that point to a difference in behavior may be simulta-
neously true. But this means that without the complete local
explanation, fˆ may act in ways unknown to the agent x0 or
the public that is biased or unfair. Worse, the constructor or
owner of fˆ will be able to conceal this fact if the decision for
x0 is overdetermined, by offering counterfactual explanations
using maps ∆i that don’t mention the biased feature.
So we need another constraint on satisfactory explanations:
a satisfactory explanation must make clear the biases of the
system which may account for 0’s incomplete understanding
of f or fˆ . To be more precise, we say that fˆ exhibits a biased
dependency on particular preducial factor P, which we can
also take to be a map on X , just in case for some ∆i, and for
some incompatible predictions δ and pi
fˆ (∆i(xp)) = δ (1)
fˆ (P(∆i(xp))) = pi (2)
Note that the incompleteness condition for a conundrummir-
rors the notion of a biased dependency. As a person with data
xp might reasonably want to know whether such biases were
the result of a particular decision, we put one additional con-
straint on appropriate explanations:
CB an appropriate explanation for explainee Amust lay bare
any prejudicial factors P that affect A. That is, where pi, δ
and P are defined as above, the explanation must provide
fˆ (∆(xp)) = δ and fˆ (P(∆(xp))) = pi
In our loan example, explanations that obey (CB) might not
be in the interest of the bank that owns the ML algorithm. For
instance, the bias of the bank against loans to people of color
is unfair to A. But the bank might not want to have this bias
exposed. This is the ethical problem for explanations.
To attain an appropriate explanation meeting CB, we can-
not simply rely on the bank’s proferred explanation, as the
bank may have something to hide. In similar fashion, even if
we have access to all of fˆ , we cannot rest content with just
one counterfactual explanation that satisfies CM and CI. We
have to ensure that CB is met as well. We will say that a set of
counterfactuals provides an adequate local explanation just in
case it obeys CM, CI and CB.
Let us suppose that we do not have access to fˆ . To find an
appropriate explanation, we imagine a game played between
the bank and the would be loan taker, in which the loan taker
can ask questions of the bank (or owner/ developer of the al-
gorithm) about the algorithm’s decisions. More particularly,
we propose to use a two player game, an explanation game to
get at appropriate explanations for A.
To define an explanation game, we first fix a set of two
players {0,1}. (1− i) denotes the opponent of i.
The moves or actions in the game for 0, denoted A0, are
to request an explanation from 1 about the behavior of fˆ at
xp, which means requesting a particular linear map ∆i. 0 may
accept an explanation provided by 1 or reject 1’s explanation
and request an explanation different from explanations pre-
viously offered by 1; that is request a ∆ j where j and i are
different sets of dimensions of X (this move is known as re-
striction. Alternatively, 0 may force 1 to provide a counterfac-
tual explanation generating linear map for a particular set of
dimensions. If 0 is allowed to use forcing, then she can name
which dimensions she wants varied to find a boundary point
of N fˆ ,xp .
1’s moves A1 consists of the following: 1 may offer a ∆ j
generating a counterfactual explanation; 1 may also claim that
a particular map ∆ j for dimensions j does generate a counter-
factual explanation—that is, for no values in dimensions j do
we get the requested prediction; 1 may also insist that a previ-
ously given ∆ solve 0’s conundra. The game terminates when
(a) 0 is convinced that her conundra are resolved or (b) when
all possible ∆ have been examined or (c) 0 does not want to
continue anymore.
We assume that in an explanation game it is common
knowledge among the players that one can check the truth
of 1’s responses and whether 1’s counterfactuals address the
constraints we have mentioned. Thus, we do not address is-
sues of deceit here.
We can now specify an explanation game and its winning
condition for player 0.
Definition 1. An Explanation game, G , concerning a poly-
nomially computable function fˆ : Xn → Y , where Xn is a
space of data and Y a set of predictions, is a tuple ((A0 ∪
A1, fˆ : X
n → Y,xp,C) where:
i. 1, but not 0 has access to the behavior of fˆ .
ii. xp ∈ X
n is the starting position, and 0 opens G with a
request for an explanation.
iii. 1 responds to 0’s requests (forcing or restriction) or
claims an adequate explanation is already provided.
iv. C ⊆ Xn is a local minimum of fˆ with respect to the
neighbourhood N fˆ ,x, where x is the current position in
the game. Every c ∈ C resolves one or more of 0’s co-
nundra CM or CI.
We say that 0 wins G just in case in G she acquires a set of
counterfactuals about the behavior of fˆ concerning features
C that answer her conundrum.
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If the dimensions encoding data in X are common knowl-
edge, then 0 always has a winning strategy in an explanation
game. We will assume this, and so the real question is how
quickly 0 can achieve her winning condition. This depends
on three parameters. The first has to do with whether 0 knows
which are the prejudicial dimensions for fˆ ’s behavior. In gen-
eral this is not known; an algorithm fˆ may be shown to be
insensitive say to an explicit gender dimension in the data in
the sense that it makes the same predictions whether this fea-
ture is taken into account or not. Nevertheless, fˆ might still
be gender sensitive, because other dimensions of X encode
gender information, making the gender dimension itself su-
perfluous. In general we do not assume that 0 knows which
dimensions are prejudicial—i.e., which dimensions encode
prejudicial factors.
The second parameter governing complexity is the degree
of the set C of cascading counterfactuals associated with
N fˆ ,xp . The third has to do whether 0 is allowed forcing moves
or only restriction moves.7 If we assume that 1 has already
calculated the boundary of N fˆ ,xp , then the following results
are in order.
Proposition 2. Suppose in an explanation game G involving
fˆ and where 0 has focal point xp ∈ X
n and the cascading de-
gree of S(N fˆ ,xp) < 3. If 0 knows which dimensions encode
prejudicial factors, she has an at worst linear time winning
strategy using forcing. If she does not know know which di-
mensions encode prejudicial factors, 0 has an worst n2 time
winning strategy.
To see that this, note that 0 needs only to force 1 to pro-
vide the counterfactuals that vary the known prejudicial fac-
tors together with at most one other feature value. The set of
counterfactuals uncovered is a linear function of n.
If we do not assume 0 knows the prejudicial factors, then:
Proposition 3. Suppose in an explanation game G involving
fˆ with 0’s data as focal point xp ∈ X
n and the cascading de-
gree of S(N fˆ ,xp) = k≥ 3. Then 0 has a winning strategy using
forcing in G that is in the complexity class Polynomial Local
Search (PLS) in the worst case [Johnson et al., 1988].
Given that fˆ is polynomial and the cascading degree of
S(N fˆ ,xp) is fixed, finding the neighbors of a boundary point
of N fˆ ,xp is poly-time. Thus, 0’s winning strategy for the game
meets the conditions for a PLS problem.
What happens when 0 cannot force 1 to provide certain
counterfactuals, but can restrict 1 to shift a single dimension
in his explanation?
Proposition 4. Suppose that for X ⊂ Rn in an explanation
game G, with fˆ and 0 with focal point xp ∈ X
n and the cas-
cading degree of S(N fˆ ,xp)< 2. Then 0 has a worst case linear
time with respect to n winning strategy in G.
7The complexity of the winning condition is important in a
realistic model where finding an explanation is time sensitive. If
0 takes too long to find the explanation, she loses. The standard
way to do this is to exploit discounting [Shapley, 1953]. See also
[Asher and Paul, 2016] for a setting more similar to this one.
Given that 0 can only ask for a single dimension to be
shifted, her strategy is just to go through all the dimensions
by continuing to ask for a new explanation. Eventually 0
will have gone through all of the dimensions of Xn. As the
cascading degree of S(N fˆ ,xp) < 2, she will have determined
S(N fˆ ,xp).
Once the cascading degree associated with N fˆ ,xp ≥ 2,
Player 1 can hide, if he wishes, prejudicial factors for expo-
nential time.
Proposition 5. Suppose that for X ⊂ Rn in an explanation
game G, with fˆ and 0 with focal point xp ∈ X
n and the cas-
cading degree of S(N fˆ ,xp ≥ 2. Then 0 has a worst case expo-
nential time with respect to n winning strategy in G.
Player 1 in this case is free to provide counterfactuals
that satisfy constraint (CI) and (CM) but possibly not (CB)
and can provide counterfactuals with arbitrarily complex an-
tecedents. Without forcing, 0 cannot make 1 provide counter-
factuals that take satisfy (CB). However, given that the bound-
ary N fˆ ,xp is computable, 0 still has a winning strategy with
restriction in an explanation game. She will eventually com-
pute the boundary of N fˆ ,xp in exponential time wrt to n in the
worst case .
We draw from this the moral that in order to be effective an
explanation game must allow 0 to force 1 to vary certain di-
mensions that 0 picks and S(N fˆ ,xp)must have a fixed cascad-
ing degree. We also claim that having such a fixed cascading
degree might be an important aspect of good explanations, as
there is an important connection between cascading degrees
and the generality of laws. A low cascading degree means a
general set of laws, which a priori is preferable scientifically.
6 Conclusions and outlook
We have used the semantics and logic of counterfactuals to
explore epistemically accessible and adequate but partial ex-
planations. Counterfactual explanations are promising vehi-
cles for epistemic accessibility, and we have shown that they
can algorithmically provide adequate explanations where all
biases are made clear if certain conditions (forcing) obtain
and the cascading degree of the set of counterfactuals describ-
ing the local neighborhood around the focal point is fixed.
However, we have not explored here another important pa-
rameter for epistemic adequacy. Adequacy also depends on
the characterization of the input data X for a learning algo-
rithm fˆ : X → Y . If the dimensionality of X is too high or if
the dimensions don’t correspond to intuitive concepts, then
even partial explanations may not be satisfactory. So to get
fully explanatory counterfactuals for the behavior of fˆ , it will
be important in such cases to find the right representation of
the data for the explainee.
Counterfactual explanations may also express adversarial
examples. These typically aren’t good explanations of the
phenomenon fˆ is trying to model. Nevertheless such coun-
terfactuals explain the behavior of fˆ and can be as such very
valuable.
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